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Expertise is characterized by fast decision-making which is highly adaptive to new
situations. Here we propose that athletes use a toolbox of heuristics which they develop
on their route to expertise. The development of heuristics occurs within the context of
the athletes’ natural abilities, past experiences, developed skills, and situational context,
but does not pertain to any of these factors separately. This is a novel approach because
it integrates separate factors into a comprehensive heuristic description. The novelty of
this approach lies within the integration of separate factors determining expertise into a
comprehensive heuristic description. It is our contention that talent identiﬁcation methods
and talent development models should therefore be geared toward the assessment and
development of speciﬁc heuristics. Speciﬁcally, in addition to identifying and developing
separate natural abilities and skills as per usual, heuristics should be identiﬁed and
developed. The application of heuristics to talent and expertise models can bring the ﬁeld
one step away from dichotomized models of nature and nurture toward a comprehensive
approach to the route to expertise.
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INTRODUCTION
Most current theories of expertise are based on the principle that
knowledge underlies performance (Ericsson et al., 2006). Specif-
ically, Ericsson et al. (2006) suggest that the speciﬁc knowledge
of experts arises through about 10.000 h of deliberate practice.
More research studies have also shown that previous knowl-
edge guides attention for accurate performance (e.g., Bilalic´ et al.,
2010). Drawing on the importance of knowledge for performance,
the heuristic approach focuses on how that knowledge can be
effectively searched and a how solution implemented.
Heuristics are rules of thumb that allow fast and frugal decision-
making. The concept of heuristicswas introducedby Simon (1982)
to explain how humans decide when they have limited resources.
He proposed that behavior could only be understood through
analyzing both the person and the environment where the behav-
ior took place. The subsequent work of Gigerenzer et al. (1999)
identiﬁed and tested speciﬁc heuristics in a number of different
environments. For instance, they found the recognition heuristic
whereby people choose the option they recognize over the option
they do not recognize (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999). Recently,
the simple heuristics researchprogramhas beenused in the context
of sport. Raab (2012) showed that athletes use simple heuristics
both to make decisions and to implement them in the sports envi-
ronment. What is still lacking, however, is an understanding of
how simple heuristics develop in the route to expertise.
HEURISTICS AS CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERTISE AND TALENT
DEVELOPMENT
The topic of expertise has been gaining increased prominence
in science and the media because researchers, practitioners, and
laypeople wish to replicate the route to success in the most efﬁ-
cient way. In sport, and especially in team sports, experts are
those with repeated top-level performance who can most efﬁ-
ciently resolve the situation put before them. The route to that level
of expertise will no doubt have involved uncountable attempts
some successful but many unsuccessful. Here we will argue that
the developmental process is inherently non-optimal and non-
linear, but that this is indispensable to acquire the highest levels
of expertise. To say that athletes show optimal adaptation to var-
ious situations related to their sport does not equate to saying
that their actions or behaviors are optimal, but rather that these
are cost-effective actions or behaviors. This is especially the case
where performance involves fast decision-making. The best deci-
sion is not the optimal decision per se, but the one that can solve
the current situation well enough and fast enough (Simon, 1982;
Raab et al., 2009; Todd et al., 2012). It is important to qualify
what is meant by optimal performance so that efforts to iden-
tify and develop talented athletes are geared toward functional
(not optimal) decision-making. The route to expertise starts by
demonstrating a talent. Talent identiﬁcation is the process of rec-
ognizing the potential of an athlete to excel in a particular sport.
Talent development, on the other hand, is the process by which
an athlete can realize that potential, which includes beneﬁting
from the most appropriate learning and training environments
(Vaeyens et al., 2008).
CLASSICAL MODELS IN TALENT DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL ABILITIES
AND NURTURE
Natural abilities together with environmental and intrapersonal
catalysts are, according to Gulbin et al. (2010), the non-random
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factors contributing to the developmental process which leads
to speciﬁc competencies. The distinction between natural abil-
ities and catalysts reﬂects current views on talent identiﬁcation
and development which show a facet of the nature vs. nur-
ture debate (e.g., Baker et al., 2003; Epstein, 2013). The focus
of this debate is on general natural abilities and environmen-
tal factors that lead to general competencies (cf. categorizations
by Gagné, 1999). For instance perceptiveness and coordination
are considered general natural abilities and thought to inﬂuence
talent development. Athletes are often identiﬁed on general per-
ceptual or motor skills, and their development often focuses on
these general abilities. Paradoxically, researchers and practition-
ers agree that expert athletes specialize in their sport and that
a general skill is not sufﬁcient for expert performance. One of
the marks of expertise is the use of unique solutions to solve
situations in the playﬁeld and in other situations related with
the sport. In other words, expert athletes are characterized by
their optimal adaptation to all things related with their sport,
including effective decision-making in situ rather than by general
abilities.
THE HEURISTICS APPROACH TO TALENT DEVELOPMENT
A useful framework to understand unique adaptations to new
situational contexts is the heuristic approach. Athletes use heuris-
tics or rules of thumb which are speciﬁc to the type of situation
and can be used rapidly without much cost. The development
of heuristics occurs within the context of the athletes’ natural
abilities, but also their past experiences, developed skills, and
situational contexts. It does not pertain to any of these factors
separately, instead, heuristics pertain to the repertoire of the
athlete and it is our contention that talent identiﬁcation meth-
ods and talent development models should be geared toward the
assessment and development of heuristics. This can be done by
improving the efﬁciency in the use of an existing heuristic (e g.,
calibrating the heuristic to more valid cues), or learning which
heuristic ﬁts best with a speciﬁc environment (e g., Gigeren-
zer and Gaissmaier, 2011). The heuristics repertoire consists of
psychological, neurophysiological, and perceptual-motor adap-
tations (Raab et al., 2009; Raab, 2012; Todd et al., 2012). Each
heuristic is used for speciﬁc situations in much the same way
as a hammer is used for nailing pictures but not for cutting
branches. By deﬁnition a heuristic is composed of at least three
building blocks. They are search rules, search-stopping rules, and
decision rules. Within sports a fourth building block has been pro-
posed which deals with the execution rules. We will expand on
these.
Search rules include two kinds of search: search for informa-
tion cues and search for alternatives. In most ball games the
alternatives are ﬁxed (i.e., players can only either pass, drib-
ble, throw, etc.) so the athlete searches for information cues
to decide on which of these actions to use. While novice ath-
letes may search for information cues randomly, expert athletes
can directly use the information cues with the highest validity
(de Oliveira et al., 2009; Esteves et al., 2011). When the alterna-
tive actions are not speciﬁed, then search rules for the action
itself must be generated. In these cases the task characteristics
specify whether it is most advantageous to broaden or limit the
search. For instance in chess it is advantageous to broaden the
search for options (Bilalic et al., 2009), whereas in more time-
pressured sports it may be best to narrow the search for options
(Raab and Johnson, 2007).
Search-stopping rules are the rules by which one stops search-
ing for information cues or alternative actions. Classical models
presumed that there was a way to compute the optimal stop-
ping point where the costs of further search would exceed
its beneﬁts. However, to say that athletes show optimal use
of heuristics does not equate to saying that their actions or
behaviors are optimal, but rather that these are cost-effective
actions or behaviors. This means that an expert athlete knows
when the search for information cues must stop and will
use whatever information was gathered to make the decision
in due time. This also means that novice athletes must be
placed in situations that potentiate their search for the most
valid information cues, and must also be placed in situations
where decisions must be made based on low-quality information
cues.
Decision rules describe how a decision is made after search has
been stopped. Decision rules deﬁne how the available informa-
tion is used to make a decision. Psychology has a tradition of
assuming that intelligent behavior implies weighting and com-
bining information cues (e.g., multiple linear regression models),
but the research on fast and frugal heuristics has shown that fre-
quently less is more. For instance, the recognition heuristic is a
decision rule whereby the option chosen is simply based on one
valid cue that point to one option and not to an alternative option
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999). Again, expert athletes have the
heuristic repertoire to make the best decisions the fastest, whereas
novice athletes must be placed in situations that build up their
repertoire.
Execution rules address questions like what action to carry
out and how to execute it as already described for decision
processes (Raab et al., 2005). Those rules are based on indi-
vidual experience (Raab and Johnson, 2007). Athletes should
be exposed to situations that force them to decide between
options to learn execution criteria and build heuristics for various
situations.
These rules are the building blocks of heuristics and they can
help explain how athletes develop their expertise in terms of
decision-making and problem-solving which are key competences
in expert performance.
HEURISTICS IN THE ROUTE TO SPORT EXPERTISE: BUILDING AN
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
Heuristics are domain-speciﬁc and can be used to formally
describe the link between natural and nurtured characteristics.
In fact heuristics are neutral in the nature vs. nurture debate
because they can be learned but they can also be available at birth
(cf., Baker et al., 2003, 2012). As an illustration, very small chil-
dren will naturally cluster around a ball. The building blocks of
the heuristic used might be: search for ball, stop searching when
the ball is found, decide to move closer to the ball. This behav-
ior continues until they learn that exploring the space increases
the chance of receiving the ball. Here they may change the rules
of the existing heuristic into: search for space in relation to the
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ball, stop when space is found, and decide to move the space.
Again, this behavior will continue until they learn that not only
space but also the defensive players are important in receiving
the ball. Here they may again change the rules of the existing
heuristic into: search for the space in relation to the ball and the
defensive player, stop when you found it decide to move to the
space.
Heuristics are also speciﬁc to the sportive situations that the
athlete encounters. Therefore, nature and nurture, which are
normally described separately in models of talent identiﬁcation
and development, can instead be described as heuristics. This
would allow future research on expertise to conceptually integrate
phylogenetic (natural abilities), ontogenetic (development) and
situational factors. As an illustration, take the phenomenon of
less-is-more for situations where there is an abundance of cues.
We explore how athletes with different natural abilities (John and
Mary) may become experts in their sport. John may have a natu-
ral ability to focus on a small number of cues and use those cues
to maximal advantage. He will be identiﬁed as talented because
of his consistent results in particular situations (rather than his
creativity). During development, John may specialize in the use
of those cues and become an expert in using them and hence
build a narrow repertoire of expertise. Provided these are the
most valid cues for the sports situation, John will also be an
expert in his sport. If the sport offers a lot more variety, how-
ever, John will need to beneﬁt from a varied training program
that forces him to explore and use other cues for other situa-
tions. Mary, on the other hand, may have a natural ability to focus
on a large number of cues and will therefore use various com-
binations of cues. She might be identiﬁed as talented because of
her creative solutions (rather than her consistent results). Dur-
ing development, Mary may learn which cues are most valid to
which situation and hence build a broad repertoire of expertise.
Provided a number of cue combinations is required for the sports
situation, Mary will also be an expert in her sport. If the sport
offers little variety, however, Mary will need to beneﬁt from a spe-
cialized training program that forces her to use the most valid
cues.
CONCLUSION
The heuristics approach to expertise is useful because it takes into
account the natural abilities and development of the athlete, as
well as the situations posed by the sport and the training envi-
ronment. It partly addresses the eternal nature vs. nurture debate
and can provide suggestions for training programs which aim at
developing the individual natural abilities of athletes by providing
adequate sports situations. This is currently being developed in the
area of decision-making (Marasso et al., accepted). The practical
applicationof heuristics to talent identiﬁcation and talent develop-
ment models will bring the ﬁeld one step away from dichotomized
models and toward a true comprehensive approach to the route
to expertise. Future research can use the heuristics approach to
investigate how the route to expertise sometimes deviates from the
mainstream to create novel solutions. For instance, new techniques
like the Fosbury ﬂop in track-and-ﬁeld and the Tsukahara’s vault
in gymnastics (Bar-Eli et al., 2008) highlight alternatives found by
expert athletes who did not ﬁt a standard model of talent.
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